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Abstract 
This paper examines for the first time the impact of problem loans on Japanese productivity 
growth. We exploit a new data set of Japanese problem loans classified into two categories: 
bankrupt and restructured loans. We opt for a novel and flexible productivity growth 
decomposition that allows to measure the direct impact of these problem loans on productivity 
growth. The results reveal that Japanese bank productivity growth was severely constrained by 
bankrupt and restructured loans early in 2000s, whilst some persistence of the negative impact 
of problem loans on productivity growth is observed in the late 2000s. Thereafter, there is only 
some partial recovery in the productivity growth from 2012 to 2015.  Further, we also perform 
cluster analysis to examine convergence or divergence across regions and over time. We 
observe limited convergence, though Regional Banks seem to form clusters in some regions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been extensive theoretical and empirical research into the field of firm efficiency 
and productivity (Heshmati, Kumbhakar, & Sun, 2014; Subal C. Kumbhakar & Tsionas, 2016; 
Sun, Kumbhakar, & Tveterås, 2015). In terms of bank efficiency and productivity, the outbreak 
of the global financial crisis has driven a surge of banking studies (Matousek, Rughoo, Sarantis, 
& Assaf, 2015; Tsionas, Assaf, & Matousek, 2015;, Mamatzakis et al. 2016; Mamatzakis and 
Tsionas, 2019), unfolding the paramount importance of financial intermediaries within the 
economic system. In terms of productivity growth, evidence is rather limited with studies that 
apply parametric methods to evaluate bank productivity (Boucinha, Ribeiro, & Weyman-Jones, 
2013; Feng & Serletis, 2010; Feng & Zhang, 2012, 2014). As indicated in a review of non-
parametric productivity applied in banking by Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), the majority of 
studies adopt a non-parametric approach (Fukuyama & Weber, 2005, 2010; Liu & Tone, 2008).  
Our study extends the literature on bank productivity by opting for a parametric estimation 
technique. We decompose bank productivity growth into different components, namely the 
effects of problem loans, which are essentially uncontrollable inputs, quasi-fixed input, returns 
to scale, and technological change. The Japanese banking system is of interest as its 
performance has been undermined by an unprecedented volume of bankrupt and restructured 
loans. These loans are referred as risk-monitored loans disclosed in accordance with the 
Japanese Banking Law. Moreover, in Japanese banking literature, bank efficiency studies have 
dominated the research field of bank performance, for example Drake and Hall (2003), 
Fukuyama and Weber (2005), Fukuyama and Weber (2010), Barros, Managi, and Matousek 
(2012), Yang and Morita (2013). Japanese bank productivity has been rather neglected (Assaf, 
Barros, & Matousek, 2011; Fukuyama, 1995; Fukuyama, Guerra, & Weber, 1999; Mamatzakis 
et al. 2016; Mamatzakis and Koutsomanolis-Filippaki, 2009).  
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We, thus, fill a gap in the literature and apply for the first time a productivity growth 
decomposition to Japanese banks, where problem loans’ impact would be revealed.1 Previous 
literature has considered nonperforming loans as uncontrollable inputs or undesirable outputs 
in the banking production process (Assaf, Matousek, & Tsionas, 2013; Barros et al., 2012; 
Drake & Hall, 2003; Fukuyama & Weber, 2008; Glass, McKillop, Quinn, & Wilson, 2014; 
Hughes & Mester, 2010; Mamatzakis, Matousek, & Vu, 2016; Mamatzakis and Vu 2018; 
Mamatzakis and Tsionas 2017). We follow Drake and Hall (2003) and Hughes and Mester 
(2010) to treat bankrupt and restructured loans as uncontrollable inputs in our productivity 
decomposition.2 Given the extensive volume of bankrupt and restructured loans in Japan, we 
expect that they have an impact on bank productivity. Arguably, banks may receive payments 
of the principal and interest on these loans subject to borrowers’ financial health. These overdue 
loans in turn would raise bank’s operating costs in the short-run. Hence, one would expect these 
loans to deteriorate bank productivity.  
Alongside bankrupt and restructured loans, we also employ equity as a quasi-fixed input 
(Berger & DeYoung, 1997; Hughes, Mester, & Moon, 2001; Ray & Das, 2010; Mamatzakis 
and Bermpei 2016; Mamatzakis et al. 2015). Within a short period, it would be unfeasible to 
adjust the level of equity considerably and quickly (Lozano-Vivas & Pasiouras, 2014; 
Mamatzakis and Tsionas, 2019; Mamatzakis and Tsionas, 2017; Mamatzakis and 
Koutsomanolis-Filippaki, 2009). In the event of unexpected losses, the level of equity is of 
utmost importance to ensure bank safety and soundness, preventing banks from temporary 
illiquidity and insolvency (Diamond & Rajan, 2000; Mamatzakis and Koutsomanolis-Filippaki, 
2009). Equity would also serve as a cost-reducing factor due to less interest paid for debt 
financing (Hughes & Mester, 2013; Mamatzakis and Psillaki 2017). Finally, the inclusion of 
equity in our productivity decomposition is of importance for Japan. The reason is that during 
the banking crisis in the late 1990s, there was a prolonged period of undercapitalisation until 
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the early 2000s. The Japanese authorities responded by injecting public capital four times 
between March 1998 and June 2003 (Hoshi & Kashyap, 2010), hoping to stabilise the financial 
market and revive the banking industry. 
 The contribution of this study can be summarised in the following ways. First, we expand 
the parametric methodological literature of bank productivity growth (Boucinha et al., 2013; 
Casu, Ferrari, & Zhao, 2013; Lozano-Vivas & Pasiouras, 2014) as opposed to the broadly 
applied nonparametric one (Alam, 2001; Berg, Forsund, & Jansen, 1992; Delis, Molyneux, & 
Pasiouras, 2011; Fiordelisi & Molyneux, 2010; Grifell-Tatjé & Lovell, 1997; Kao & Liu, 2014; 
Wheelock & Wilson, 1999). Our paper refers to Japan, which serves as an excellent case study 
given the trouble of its banking industry (Barros, Managi, & Matousek, 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Fukuyama & Weber, 2002). Second, we exploit a new data set of bankrupt and restructured 
loans, which are disaggregated from “risk-monitored loans” disclosed subject to the Japanese 
Banking Law. The adopted approach enables a comprehensive analysis by allowing for the 
impact of these loans on total factor productivity growth. Finally, we test for convergence – 
catching up effect – among Japanese banks and geographic regions by using club convergence 
analysis proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007). This methodology is superior compared to others 
such as the β-convergence and σ-convergence. For a panel data variable, it can detect 
convergence in sub-groups even though convergence is rejected at the whole panel level. After 
more than a decade of the banking crisis and structural reforms, converging on productivity 
growth would indicate that Japanese banks have been brought together to facilitate further 
necessary policy changes, especially on the ground of continued deflation and low economic 
growth (Mamatzakis E and F Avalos 2018; Mamatzakis and Vu 2018). 
Our results show that productivity growth in Japanese commercial banks is impaired by 
the impact of bankrupt loans. The destructive effect of these loans varies over time, appearing 
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to capture events such as government interventions, the global financial crisis, and the Tohoku 
tsunami/earthquake. Interestingly, restructured loans are among the drivers of productivity 
growth, as they are found to lower costs. With regard to the club convergence analysis, we find 
divergence in productivity growth across regions over time. However, some integration, and 
thus convergence, is identified for Regional Banks I, whereas there exist some clubs of 
convergence within City Banks, and within the regions of Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, 
Chugoku, and Shikoku.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature in bank productivity. Section 3 presents the methodology, followed by the data 
description in section 4. Empirical results are provided in section 5, and convergence tests are 
discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section highlights the literature in bank productivity with a particular focus on the 
approaches used to decompose total factor productivity (TFP) growth. In what follows, we 
briefly survey the studies that apply nonparametric and parametric methodologies to measure 
bank productivity. 
2.1. Non-parametric studies 
The decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index through Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) has prevailed in the banking literature. As indicated in a comprehensive review 
for bank efficiency and productivity (Fethi & Pasiouras, 2010), almost all studies before 2010 
apply this approach. Berg et al. (1992) use this technique to obtain the productivity index for 
Norwegian banking, where the largest banks are found to be strongly productive after 
deregulation. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Alam (2001) show that the driving factor for 
productivity growth in US banking was advances in technology during 1980s-1990s. Grifell-
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Tatjé and Lovell (1997) replace the Malmquist productivity index by a generalised Malmquist 
productivity index, allowing for the measurement of the contribution of scale economies on 
productivity growth. In a similar vein, Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) obtain TFP growth of 
European banking, where technological change was the most productive component which 
contributed to shareholder’s value. Other studies include Tortosa-Ausina, Grifell-Tatjé, 
Armero, and Conesa (2008), which use a bootstrapping techniques to derive the Malmquist 
index, and Kao and Liu (2014), which employ a probabilistic analysis. Productivity growth 
studies in Japanese banking are also dominated by those adopting nonparametric 
methodologies (Assaf et al., 2011; Barros et al., 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; Fukuyama et al., 1999; 
Fukuyama & Weber, 2002). 
Flexibility is the main feature of a semi-parametric approach that attracts research interest. 
This methodology to measure productivity, however, has been mainly applied in nonbanking 
research (Heshmati et al., 2014). Sun et al. (2015) propose a semiparametric cost frontier of 
which the slope coefficients are a nonparametric function of the time trend. The semiparametric 
cost function is estimated first, followed by a decomposition of inefficiency into time-varying 
and time-invariant components. Finally, productivity is decomposed based on the estimated 
cost frontier. Although the authors use Norwegian farming data set as an example, this 
methodology could also be of interest for banking applications.  
2.2. Parametric studies 
Bank productivity in parametric studies is mainly derived from estimating cost, profit, or 
distance functions. For the use of the cost function, Kim and Weiss (1989) estimate an equation 
system consisting of the translog cost function and cost shares of inputs to examine the effect 
of branches on TFP growth of Israeli banks during 1979-1982. For the Indian banking sector 
from 1985 to 1996, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) estimate a translog shadow cost function 
together with one equation of the shadow cost share of one input, using seemingly unrelated 
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regression. TFP growth is decomposed into three components: a scale factor, a technological 
change, and a miscellaneous part. All three factors depend on regulation via shadow prices of 
inputs which are a product of actual input prices and a function component defined as the 
distortion function of labour relative to capital. Also utilising the cost function, Stiroh (2000) 
examines productivity in US bank holding companies during the 1990s using several 
econometric approaches: i) pooling annual data and estimate the shift from the cost function; 
ii) incorporating bank holding companies’ specific effects in panel data, and estimating the 
shift in a common cost function; and iii) decomposing total cost changes into changes in 
business conditions and in productivity. Estimating a cost function on its own by using 
stochastic frontier analysis, Boucinha et al. (2013) obtain the estimated parameters and 
compute total factor productivity change for Portuguese banks. Their results suggest that 
technological progress was the main driver of total factor productivity change from 1992 to 
2006.  
Berger and Mester (2003) estimate cost and profit functions for US banks during 1991-
1997 to obtain cost productivity change and profit productivity change. Productivity change in 
this study is defined as changes in best practice and changes in inefficiency. Focusing on off-
balance sheet variables, Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2014) also obtain productivity change 
by applying this parametric decomposition on an international sample for the period 1999-
2006. Using a translog profit function, Kumbhakar, Lozano-Vivas, Lovell, and Hasan (2001) 
measure productivity change as the sum of technical change which is defined as shifts in the 
profit frontier, and variation in the components of profit technical efficiency. For Spanish 
saving banks during 1986-1995, there was evidence for high technical inefficiency, but 
significant technical progress. Following the parametric technique in Berger and Mester 
(2003), Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux (2004) obtain productivity growth of European 
banking sectors to compare with findings from the Malmquist index. Their results confirm the 
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strong productivity growth for Italian and Spanish banks, whereas mixed evidence is reported 
for the German and French banking sectors. Casu et al. (2013) also use both Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate productivity change of 
Indian banks 1992-2009. They further conduct a metafrontier analysis to account for 
technology heterogeneity amongst banks with different ownership structures.  
Chaffai, Dietsch, and Lozano-Vivas (2001) use a stochastic output distance function to 
decompose the Malmquist index into pure technological effect and environmental effect. Orea 
(2002) also opts for the distance function to introduce a parametric decomposition of a 
generalised Malmquist productivity index. The TFP index in Orea (2002) is contributed by the 
Malmquist productivity index and a returns to scale term. Applying the parametric 
decomposition for Spanish saving banks (1985-1998), Orea (2002) finds that TFP growth was 
mainly attributed to technical progress, although the scale effect also revealed a positive impact 
on productivity change. Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, Margaritis, and Staikouras (2009) 
parameterise the directional distance function to examine Luenberger productivity indicator for 
banking industries in Central and Eastern European countries (1998-2003). Their finding 
suggests that the dominant factor driving productivity growth was technological change. Feng 
and Zhang (2012) and Feng and Zhang (2014) adopt a true random stochastic distance frontier 
model to allow for unobserved heterogeneity among US banks. The “output-distance-function-
based-Divisa” productivity index proposed in Feng and Serletis (2010) is used in these studies 
to measure TFP growth of large US banks. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Decomposing productivity growth  
The starting point is to minimise total cost given a production function F. This optimisation 
takes the form: 
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where F denotes the production function with outputs Y, inputs X, input prices w (with k being 
the number of inputs), input b which is outside the control of the bank, equity E, and technology 
t. We treat equity E as quasi-fixed as adjustment in equity quickly is over the long run (Lozano-
Vivas & Pasiouras, 2014).  
To derive the impact of bank input outside the control of the bank (i.e. problem loans) on 
productivity growth, we adopt the methodology proposed by Morrison and Schwartz (1996). 
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Thus, we can obtain equation (5), where
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Rearranging equation (5) with respect to Ct , we get: 
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Thus, substituting the first two terms in the right-hand side of equation (6) with the term 4 
as in equation (f.4.4) of footnote 4, we obtain equation (7): 
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Now note that the total factor productivity growth (if constant returns to scale, 1=CY ), 
that is the Solow residual, showing the difference between the rate of change of outputs and 
the rate of change of inputs is: 
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In the case of non-constant returns to scale, the traditional measure of productivity growth 
will be adjusted by combining equations (7) and (8) to get: 
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Rearranging equation (9), we obtain equation (10): 
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The terms in the right-hand side of equation (10) are the impact of technological change, 
the scale effect, the impact of bank input outside the control of the bank (bankrupt and 
restructured loans), and the impact of equity respectively. 
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3.2. The translog function 
The specification of our translog cost function is as follows5: 
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where wk, Ym, bj, E denote kth input price, mth output, jth uncontrollable input, and equity 
respectively. 
Applying Shephard’s lemma for equation (11), we obtain the shares of cost attributed to 
input price kth: 
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Total differentiating equation (11) with respect to output mth, uncontrollable input jth, and 
equity, we obtain: 
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The cost function requires a monotonic condition of non-decreasing in w. We impose the 
usual symmetry restrictions sjjsnmmnlkkl  === ,,  and linear homogeneity restriction 
on the cost function (11) with respect to input prices: 
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There are two input prices: price of fund, and price of physical capital and labour.6 We 
estimate equation (11) by using the price of fund to normalise. The results obtained are then 
used to compute the impact of each component on productivity growth. 
4. DATA 
This paper employs a new data set of problem loans in Japan, providing new information 
of a critical bank uncontrollable input. Moreover, we disaggregate problem loans disclosed in 
accordance with the Japanese Banking Law into two categories. The first one consists of loans 
to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears by six months or more. The 
second component comprises loans in arrears by 3 months or more but less than 6 months, and 
restructured loans. For simplicity, we name these two types of problem loans as bankrupt loans 
(BRL) and restructured loans (RSL) thereafter. Such disaggregation of problem loans has not 
been employed widely in the Japanese banking productivity literature (Mamatzakis et al., 
2016). This disaggregation allows us to explore the extent to which each uncontrollable input, 
namely bankrupt loans and restructured loans, affects bank productivity.  
In the aftermath of the asset price bubble that burst late 1990s in Japan, problem loans rose 
dramatically since a vast number of firms went bankrupt or experienced business difficulties. 
The cost of bankrupt and restructured loans in 1997 was 30 trillion JPY (Hoshi & Kashyap, 
2000). However, some sources estimate the actual value in excess of 100 trillion JPY (Hoshino, 
2002). After 1998, the government encouraged banks to increase their lending to small- and 
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medium-sized firms (SMEs) in order to ease the “credit crunch” (Hoshi, 2011; Hoshi & 
Kashyap, 2010). However, the fact that the government subsidised these unprofitable 
borrowers dampened the entry and investment of productive firms, leading to fewer good 
lending opportunities for solvent banks (Caballero, Hoshi, & Kashyap, 2006). Prior to 2002, 
the government had deployed rescue schemes by injecting capital and bailing out troubled 
banks, but it had been claimed that there were delays of much-needed restructuring at the 
banking industry (Caballero et al., 2006). Furthermore, misdirected bank lending augmented 
the accumulated level of bankrupt and restructured loans. In 2002, the level of these loans fell, 
reflecting the effort of banks to reduce problem loans under the reform program introduced by 
Heizo Takenaka, who was in charge of the Financial Services Agency. After the recovering 
period, the global financial crisis 2007-2008 somewhat increased further the level of bankrupt 
and restructured loans.   
We employ a unique semi-annual data set provided by the Japanese Bankers Association. 
Our panel data consist of 3484 observations for Japanese commercial banks - 10 City Banks, 
65 Regional Banks I, and 56 Regional Banks II - from financial years 2000 to 2014. City Banks 
are the largest banks amongst the three types. Apart from conventional banking activities, their 
operation spreads widely from security investment to ancillary services (Tadesse, 2006). 
Regional Banks, in contrast, strongly commit to the local development in their scope of 
business. They cater the financial need of SMEs within their geographic regions. Regional 
Banks II are the smallest with a more prefectural focus.  
 To define outputs and input prices, we follow the widely accepted intermediation 
approach (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). In our cost function, in line with Fukuyama and Weber 
(2009),  Barros et al. (2012), Assaf et al. (2011), we specify two outputs: y1 net loans and bills 
discounted, and y2 earning assets which include investments, securities, and other earning 
assets. Because of data constraints, we are unable to extract data for personnel expenses or to 
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obtain their share from noninterest expenses. Therefore, we define two input prices: price of 
fund, and price of physical capital and labour, in line with Fu, Lin, and Molyneux (2014). Price 
of fund w1 is the ratio of interest expenses divided by total deposits and borrowed funds. Price 
of physical capital and labour w2 is the ratio of noninterest expenses divided by fixed assets. 
Equity is included in the cost function as a quasi-fixed input (Hughes & Mester, 2013). Table 
1 describes the summary statistics of key variables in our panel data. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Cost elasticities with respect to uncontrollable inputs and equity 
Estimated parameters satisfy the monotonic condition and linear homogeneity constraints 
of the cost function.7 The coefficients are statistically significant with appropriate signs as 
expected. Bankrupt loans are found to have a slightly stronger impact on cost than restructured 
loans (the parameters are 0.0384 and 0.0203 respectively). The impact of equity on cost is 
positive and significant (0.0533). We report the elasticities of cost with respect to bankrupt 
loans, restructured loans, equity and outputs in Table 2. Overall, for all banks in the sample, 
these variables expose a cost-augmenting effect. The average cost elasticities with respect to 
bankrupt loans, restructured loans, and equity are reported at 0.0385, 0.0201, and 0.0537 
respectively. In sub-periods, while the cost elasticity with respect to bankrupt loans appears to 
vary over time, the cost elasticity with respect to restructured loans decreases monotonically, 
turning out negative in the last two sub-periods (-0.0002 and -0.0106). This negative cost 
elasticity is attributed to the negative values found for City Banks and Regional Banks I. In 
terms of equity, there is variability in cost elasticities. The largest magnitudes for cost 
elasticities with respect to equity are in the first two sub-periods, 0.0721 in September 2000-
March 2003 and 0.0998 in September 2003-March 2006. This could reflect the high cost of 
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equity prevailing during the acute phase of the banking crisis and the restructuring period. 
Afterwards, the cost elasticity with respect to equity declines to 0.0415 in September 2006-
March 2009, and thereafter, further down to 0.0194 in September 2009-March 2012. This 
finding is in line with King (2009). King (2009) reports that the magnitude of the cost of equity 
incurred by Japanese banks is higher compared to that in other countries such as Canada, 
France, Germany, UK, and US. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Breaking up the cost elasticities according to bank types, we observe a decreasing trend of 
the cost elasticities with respect to uncontrollable inputs for City Banks. Note that these values 
are negative in the case of restructured loans in all sub-periods and in the case of bankrupt loans 
during the September 2012-March 2015 period. For Regional Banks I and II, there is also a 
downward trend for the cost elasticities with respect to restructured loans. In the September 
2009-March 2012 period and September 2012-March 2015 period, there are negative cost 
elasticities with respect to restructured loans in Regional Banks I. These findings show that 
restructured loans do not always raise cost. This is an interesting finding which could indicate 
that changes in legislation to restructure the industry might have been effective. A component 
of our restructured loan data relates to loans of which interest rates have been lowered, contracts 
have been amended, and/or loans to corporations under ongoing reorganisation (Montgomery 
& Shimizutani, 2009). Without this process, these loans would be more likely to become 
nonperforming loans, raising further bank costs. Other government support measures include 
the Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions (August 2004-March 2008, 
December 2008) and the SME Financing Facilitation Act (2008-2013) (Hoshi & Kashyap, 
2010; Endo, 2013). These Acts include capital injection programs, the relaxation of capital 
adequacy requirements, and changes in the regulatory framework which allowed bad loans of 
SMEs to be reclassified.  
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Apart from government support measures, the nature of business might also explain for the 
cost-saving impact of restructured loans. Regional Banks are committed to the development of 
the local regions where their headquarters are situated. SMEs are among their target clients. 
Therefore, Regional Banks are motivated to support SMEs through amending bad loans. As a 
result, 3-6% total credit was reclassified under the SME Financing Facilitation Act 
(International Monetary Fund, 2012).8  
Another noteworthy finding is the cost-saving impact of equity for City Banks, on average 
at -0.0221. While the cost elasticity with respect to equity remains positive in all sub-periods 
for Regional Banks I and II, it is positive only in September 2003 to March 2006 for City 
Banks. Hence, equity financing might benefit City Banks in terms of mitigating the interest 
burden from debt financing, supporting the argument of Hughes and Mester (2013). Note that 
City Banks also received support from public capital during the restructuring process, thus 
benefiting from the rescue capital. These negative elasticities could also be interpreted as how 
much banks are willing to pay for equity as it would result in cost saving (Boucinha et al., 
2013). Boucinha et al. (2013) also report a desirable impact of equity in lessening costs for 
Portuguese banks during 1992-2006. In contrast, this may not apply for Regional Banks. Their 
cost elasticities with respect to equity appear to have variability over time, with a more 
pronounced magnitude in Regional Banks I (0.0608) than in Regional Banks II (0.0541). 
The average cost elasticity with respect to outputs for all banks is 0.636 (which is less than 
1 so scale economies exist). Overall, there is an upward trend of the average cost elasticity with 
respect to outputs over time, starting from 0.563 in the first sub-period to 0.722 in the last sub-
period. In particular, City Banks experience decreasing returns to scale (1.025), while Regional 
Banks benefit from increasing returns to scale (0.652 for Regional Banks I and 0.561 for 
Regional Banks II). This is in line with previous findings of the literature on Japanese banks 
(Fukuyama, 1993; Altunbas et al., 2000; Drake and Hall, 2003; Tadesse, 2006; Azad et al., 
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2014). The cost elasticities with respect to outputs vary over time for City Banks, with the 
second sub-period (September 2003 – March 2006) recording the lowest average value at 
0.932. The cost elasticities with respect to outputs for both types of Regional Banks, in contrast, 
are less volatile than those of City Banks.   
5.2. Total factor productivity growth over time 
In Table 3, we report the average values (semi-annually) of TFP growth over time. On 
average, the productivity growth of Japanese banks during the years 2000-2014 is at 0.52%. In 
the first sub-period March 2001-March 2003, Japanese banks experienced negative 
productivity growth, which could be expected since they were undergoing major reforms to 
restore financial stability post-crisis. In the second sub-period September 2003-March 2006, 
TFP exhibited a strong growth at an average of 1.37%, thanks to the decline in bankrupt loans 
and restructured loans. This could also be attributed to the effect of quantitative easing in 
stimulating economic activity (Girardin & Moussa, 2011).9 In the third sub-period September 
2006-March 2009, TFP growth dropped markedly to 0.27%, possibly because of the onset of 
the global financial crisis 2007-2008. The destructive effect of the crisis seems short-lived, as 
TFP growth bounced back to 1.09% during the September 2009-March 2012 period, followed 
by a decrease to 0.6% in the last sub-period September 2012-March 2015. With reference to 
the Japanese banking literature, there are a few studies which estimate bank productivity 
growth, though not very recent. Using the indirect Malmquist–Russell productivity index, 
Fukuyama and Weber (2002) report a 2% decline per year on average for Japanese banks 
operating between 1992 and 1996. Studying Japanese credit cooperative banks and using the 
bootstrapped Malmquist index, Assaf et al. (2011) find that their productivity growth did not 
rise significantly during 2000-2006. Fukuyama and Weber (2017) is the latest study examining 
Japanese bank productivity growth. In general, the trend of productivity growth during 2007-
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2012 in their study is similar to our finding. Their dynamic network Luenberger indicator of 
productivity growth was increasing for the observed period.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Among bank categories, City Banks were the most productive, on average at 1.12%, 
followed by Regional Banks I (0.65%). The smallest banks in size, Regional Banks II, 
performed the lowest growth of 0.26% on average. This is in line with findings of Fukuyama 
and Weber (2017). Fukuyama (1995) also reports that between 1989 and 1991, City Banks 
were more productive than Regional Banks. In a similar vein, Barros et al. (2012) find that City 
Banks were the most efficient among the three types during 2000-2007. During the 
restructuring and the first quantitative easing period (March 2001-March 2006), City Banks 
experienced substantial growth in their productivity, notably at 2.32% during March 2001-
March 2003 and 2.65% during September 2003-March 2006. The other two types, in contrast, 
underwent negative productivity growth in the restructuring period, -0.43% for Regional Banks 
I and -1.78% for Regional Banks II. Like City Banks, their productivity growth increased 
significantly during the initial quantitative easing period September 2003-March 2006 (1.4% 
and 1.15%). In the third sub-period September 2006-March 2009, which covers the duration 
of the global financial crisis 2007-2008, City Banks bore a loss in productivity growth, -0.86%. 
Fukuyama and Weber (2017) also report negative productivity growth for City Banks during 
2007-2008. Productivity growth of Regional Banks also dropped to 0.17% (Regional Banks I) 
and 0.57% (Regional Banks II). Afterwards, productivity growth rose to 2.93% in City Banks, 
1.17% in Regional Banks I, and 0.74% in Regional Banks II. These results are relatively similar 
to the trend and the magnitude of change of productivity growth in Fukuyama and Weber 
(2017). Studying Regional Banks’ efficiency, Fukuyama and Matousek (2017) also report a 
decreasing trend of technical inefficiency for Regional Banks I after the global financial crisis 
until 2012. Afterwards, technical inefficiency of both types of Regional Banks increased. The 
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last sub-period September 2012-March 2015, which embraced the aggressive quantitative 
easing time frame, witnessed a considerable decline in productivity growth of City Banks 
(down to -2.17%). Other bank types also saw a fall in their productivity growth. 
5.3. Total factor productivity growth decomposition 
To shed light into the contribution of each component to TFP growth, we report the average 
values of the effect of each component in Table 4, according to equation (10) of our model. 
From March 2001 to March 2003, bankrupt loans dampened TFP growth by -0.45. 
Nevertheless, their negative effect was smaller compared to the impact of restructured loans, -
0.49, and the impact of returns to scale, -0.654. Equity and technological change positively 
contributed to productivity growth by 0.11 and 0.65 respectively. In the second sub-period 
September 2003-March 2006, large productivity growth was a result of the decline in bankrupt 
and restructured loans, the rise in the scale effect, and technological progress.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In the third sub-period September 2006-March 2009, on average, bankrupt loans 
constrained productivity growth with a magnitude of -0.06. In contrast, from September 2009 
onwards, they in fact contributed to productivity gain because there was a drop in the level of 
bankrupt loans for the whole banking system (gradually down from 8458 billion JPY in 
September 2009 to 5896 billion JPY in March 2015). Using nonperforming loan ratio as a 
control variable in the cost function, Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux, and Seth (2000) find a positive 
relationship between nonperforming loans and inefficiency. Mamatzakis et al. (2016) also 
report a negative impact of problem loans on Japanese bank performance. Like bankrupt loans, 
restructured loans had imposed a negative effect on TFP growth (-0.49) before the 
implementation of the Takenaka plan. From September 2003 to March 2006, the effectiveness 
of the rehabilitation program was revealed by the fall in restructured loans, consequently 
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contributing to productivity growth by 0.39%. From September 2006 to March 2015, the 
positive impact of restructured loans on TFP growth remained. Note that there was an increase 
in restructured loans in the last two sub-periods. It could be the case that the US credit crunch 
imposed a destructive effect on Japanese bank productivity growth with a lag, which was 
reflected in the rise of restructured loans after the crisis. The Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake 
in March 2011, which has been the most powerful earthquake ever in Japan, might also be 
among the reasons for the rising of restructured loans afterwards.  
Equity was among the growth drivers, although its average impact on productivity growth 
was small (0.003) for the whole sample period. In the initial sub-period March 2001-March 
2003, 0.11% was the contribution of equity to TFP growth. This could stem from the fact that 
banks were undercapitalised post-crisis, and during that time of uncertainty, the cost of equity 
financing was high. Nevertheless, banks that failed to raise enough equity were eventually 
rescued by public capital (Montgomery & Shimizutani, 2009). Therefore, they benefited from 
government subsidisation and could make use of the bailout capital. In the second and the last 
sub-periods, equity put more weight on the cost burden, thus eroding productivity growth, -
0.23 during September 2003-March 2006 and -0.06 during September 2012-March 2015. 
Between September 2006 and March 2012, equity positively contributed to productivity 
growth.  
Overall, technical progress was consistently the driving force of TFP growth. Over the 
whole period, technology accounted for the increase in TFP growth on average at 0.41. Tadesse 
(2006) also reports evidence for technological progress in Japanese banks between 1974 and 
1991. The scale effect, although fluctuating over time, on average contribute to productivity 
growth (0.09%). Boucinha et al. (2013) also find a significant contribution of returns to scale 
to increased productivity growth of Portuguese banks. Feng and Serletis (2010) find a moderate 
positive effect of returns to scale on productivity growth of large US banks, on average about 
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0.44%. Yet, the scale effect is the second largest component (after technical change) of US 
banks’ productivity growth. Computing technical and scale efficiency for Japanese commercial 
banks in 1990, Fukuyama (1993) reports that scale inefficiency is negligible compared to pure 
technical inefficiency. Regarding the quasi-fixed input, the magnitude of the contribution of 
equity over time is not considerable, 0.003. In terms of uncontrollable inputs, bankrupt loans, 
on average, showed a detrimental impact on TFP growth, -0.07. Restructured loans, in contrast, 
was among the main driving forces for productivity growth, 0.104. There is evidence to support 
that the increase in TFP growth during September 2003-March 2006 was partly attributed to 
the fall in bankrupt loans and restructured loans. The reverse is true for the initial sub-period, 
when the loss in TFP growth was also mainly explained by the scale effect.  
5.4. Total factor productivity decomposition per type of banks 
Table 5 reports the decomposition of TFP growth for each bank type. In terms of the effects 
of uncontrollable inputs, on average bankrupt loans exhibit a destructive effect on productivity 
growth of all banks. The magnitude of the impact is greater for City Banks, -0.23, than for 
Regional Banks I, -0.04, and Regional Banks II, -0.09. In the first sub-period March 2001-
March 2003, except City Banks, Regional Banks suffered a damaging effect of bankrupt loans 
on TFP growth. This finding could indicate that the restructuring scheme had helped City 
Banks to cut their bankrupt loan level. Afterwards, Regional Banks had to bear that impairment 
again during September 2006-March 2009. From September 2003-March 2015, City Banks 
endured a negative impact of bankrupt loans on productivity growth. It could be that the global 
financial crisis worsened the likelihood of recovery of bankrupt loans and downgraded 
restructured loans to bankrupt loans. The effect could be more pronounced in City Banks than 
in the others because of their size and business structure. Regional Banks are more geographical 
focus, thus, were less exposed to the contagion effect of the US credit crunch. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Restructured loans appear beneficial to productivity growth of each bank type. On average, 
they contributed to TFP growth of all types, more considerably for City Banks, 0.33. Yet, City 
Banks had to face a negative effect of restructured loans from September 2003 to March 2009. 
In the initial sub-period, Regional Banks suffered from an adverse effect of restructured loans 
on their productivity growth, while the contrary is reported for City Banks. In the remaining 
sub-periods, restructured loans enhanced TFP growth of Regional Banks. In terms of equity, 
on average, equity undermined productivity growth of Regional Banks II by -0.05, while the 
effect is favourable for City Banks, 0.21, and Regional Banks I, 0.02. Over time, there was a 
volatile impact of equity on productivity growth of Regional Banks I. From September 2003 
to March 2015, the impact of equity was persistently negative for Regional Banks II, but 
positive for City Banks. As aforementioned, the majority of City Banks and some Regional 
Banks were recipients of public funds (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). We could not rule out the 
potential benefits from capital injection programs as well as the impact of equity in saving 
interest costs from debt financing (Hughes and Mester, 2013). 
Regarding the scale effect, the influence of the global financial crisis on all banks could be 
reflected in our results. The reason is that the contribution of returns to scale declined 
considerably in the third sub-period, which covers the crisis. It was even negative in City 
Banks, -0.43 and Regional Banks I, -0.7. This might be due to quantitative easing policy that 
the scale effect was quite large in the second and the last two sub-periods, especially for 
Regional Banks (Mamatzakis E and F Avalos 2018; Mamatzakis and Vu 2018). Other studies 
also find that small Japanese banks, in particular Regional Banks, exhibit increasing returns to 
scale (Altunbas et al., 2000; Azad, Yasushi, Fang, & Ahsan, 2014; Fukuyama, 1993). 
Interestingly, there exists decreasing returns to scale for City Banks in the last period, -2.83. 
Previous research on Japanese banks also reports decreasing returns to scale for City Banks 
(Altunbas et al., 2000; Azad et al., 2014; Drake & Hall, 2003; Tadesse, 2006).  
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Turning to the effect of technology, we find strong evidence for technological progress in 
all bank types. Within City Banks, the impact of technological change on productivity growth 
was greater than this of other banks, 0.69 compared to 0.48 for Regional Banks I and 0.28 for 
Regional Banks II. From March 2001 to March 2012, Regional Banks II experienced a 
downward trend of technological progress, with technological regress, -0.05, reported in the 
September 2009-March 2012 period. In the last sub-period, technological change contributed 
to productivity growth of all banks. Evaluating technical efficiency of Japanese credit 
cooperatives, Glass et al. (2014) also find a presence of technical progress between 1998 and 
2009. Technical progress also existed for all banks in the early 1990s, although different 
productivity measures yield different timing for its presence (Fukuyama, 1996). 
6. CONVERGENCE CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
The next stage of our analysis investigates whether there is a tendency of convergence in 
TFP growth across regions and time. During the course of bank restructuring and promoting 
economic growth, the Japanese government has enacted a variety of support measures, 
including quantitative easing policy, aiming to raise bank lending to nonfinancial sectors 
(Mamatzakis E and F Avalos 2018; Mamatzakis and Vu 2018). Hence, if indeed the 
restructuring were working, we would expect a tendency of convergence in bank productivity 
growth among banks and across regions over time. We adopt the methodology developed by 
Phillips and Sul (2007) to identify the integration process in Japanese banks. This approach 
enables us to identify whether Japanese banks converge in TFP growth and its components, the 
convergence clusters and their convergence speed. Given considerable differences between 
bank types, divergence behaviour is very likely for the entire sample. Notwithstanding, within 
each type of banks and within each geographic region, convergence behaviour may be present 
in sub-groups. Failing to detect those convergence sub-groups and/or concluding a complete 
absence of convergence for the whole sample, therefore, conceals important information 
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regarding the integration process of a market. In the context of the Japanese banking industry, 
more importantly, its protracted nonperforming loan problems, this particular analysis could 
show whether banks have successfully recovered from the crisis to reach an integrated market 
in terms of productivity growth. Convergence analysis, the Phillips and Sul (2007)’s approach 
in particular, is also informative for policymakers as it reveals the banks and regions with 
divergence evidence to accommodate future policy development.  
In banking research, two widely used methods to examine convergence are β-convergence 
and σ-convergence, proposed by Barro, Sala-i-Martin, Blanchard, and Hall (1991) for the 
growth literature. Banking applications include Andrieş and Căpraru (2014), Casu and 
Girardone (2010), Fung (2006), and Weill (2013). If β-convergence regresses the growth rate 
of any variable on its initial level, σ-convergence measures the cross-sectional dispersion of 
the level of the variable over time. β < 0 implies that there exists a negative correlation between 
the initial level and the growth rate, which can be expressed as the entity that has a lower 
starting point has a faster growing speed than their counterparts which have higher initial levels. 
In the long-run, all observed units would converge to the same steady state. On the other hand, 
if the dispersion of a cross-section declines over time, there exists σ-convergence which 
exhibits the speed of each unit’s growth to converge with the average level of the sample. σ-
convergence somehow outperforms β-convergence in terms of explanatory power. Quah 
(1996) indicates a few limitations of β-convergence by referring to a situation where the entity 
with lower departing point grows so quickly that passes the ones with higher starting points, 
resulting in no convergence in the long-run. 
The Phillips and Sul (2007) approach is more advanced compared to β-convergence and 
σ-convergence. It accounts for both common and heterogeneous components of a panel data 
variable. That systemic idiosyncratic element is also allowed to evolve over time. Furthermore, 
Phillips and Sul (2007) argue that the rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence does not 
 
 
24 
always mean that there is no convergence among sub-groups of the panel. Their clustering 
algorithm can unfold the existence of club convergence within the panel. The transition 
parameter and the regression t test can be summarised as follows: 
The variable of interest Xit (in our study, it is TFP growth and its components) in the 
context of a panel data can be decomposed into a systemic component git, and a transitory 
component ait:  
ititit agX +=             (17) 
To distinguish between the common and idiosyncratic components which may be 
embraced in git and ait, equation (17) can be reformulated as:  
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with µt being a single common component and it being a time-varying idiosyncratic element 
measuring the relative share in µt of individual i at time t.  
Phillips and Sul (2007) define the relative transition coefficient hit and obtain it as follows:  
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The objective is to test whether the factor loading coefficients it  converge to δ, which 
means the relative transition coefficients hit converge to unity. Hence, in the long run, the cross-
sectional variance of hit ( ) ( ) 
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22 11  converges to zero. 
The regression test of convergence is a regression t test for the null hypothesis of 
convergence Ho: i =  and α≥0, where α is the decay rate 10 , against the alternative 
hypothesis Ha: i ≠ for all i or α<0. The log t regression is conducted in three steps: 
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i) Calculate the cross-sectional variance ratio tHH1 , where ( ) ( )
=
−=
N
i
itt hNH
1
2
11    
ii) Perform the OLS regression: ( ) ( )

++=− tt utbatLHH loglog2log 1          (20)                
where the fitted coefficient of log t, b-hat 

= 2b , is the estimate of the speed of convergence, 
and 

  is the estimate of   in Ho, and ( ) ( )1log += ttL . Phillips and Sul (2007) recommend that 
the data for this regression start at t = rT, with r = 0.3 obtained from Phillips and Sul (2007)’s 
Monte-Carlo regression. 
iii) Apply an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (HAC) robust one-sided t test of the 
inequality null hypothesis α ≥ 0 using b-hat and an HAC standard error. If t-statistics < -1.65, 
the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level.  
For the procedure to detect convergence clubs, Phillips and Sul (2007) assume a core sub-
group with convergence behaviour for at least K members. This sub-group is known. An 
additional member is then added to the group and log t test is used to examine whether this 
member belongs to the group. We can summarise the Phillips and Sul (2007) stepwise cluster 
algorithm to form the initial core sub-group as follows: 11 
Step 1: Last observation ordering. Xit individuals are ordered according to the last 
observation. If there is substantial time series volatility in Xit, the ordering may be done 
according to the time series average. 
Step 2: Core Group Formation. Select the first k highest individuals in the panel to form 
the subgroup Gk for some N > k ≥ 2, then run the log t regression and calculate the convergence 
test statistic tk for this subgroup. Choose the core group size k
∗ by maximising tk over k subject 
to min{tk } > −1.65. 
Step 3: Sieve Individuals for Club Membership. Add one individual at a time to the k∗ core 
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members and run the log t test. Include the individual in the convergence club if the t statistic 
from this regression (?̂?) is greater than a chosen critical value c. Repeat this procedure for the 
remaining individuals and form the first sub-convergence group. tb-hat of the log t test with 
this first sub-convergence group should be greater than −1.65. If not, raise the critical value c 
and repeat this step until tb-hat > −1.65 with the first sub-convergence group.  
Step 4: Stopping Rule. Form a subgroup of the individuals for which ?̂? < c in Step 3. Run 
the log t test. This subgroup converges if tb-hat > −1.65. If not, repeat Steps 1–3 on this 
subgroup to determine whether there is a smaller convergence subgroup. If there is no k in Step 
2 for which tk > −1.65, the remaining individuals diverge.  
In the context of our data, we explore the process of banking integration in the convergence 
of TFP growth, and the effect of each component in 121 Japanese commercial banks. 12 
Matousek et al. (2015) also apply this methodology for testing banking integration in the ‘old’ 
European Union using bank-level efficiency data. Rughoo and Sarantis (2012) use this 
approach to test the convergence of deposit and lending rates in the European retail banking 
market. To our knowledge, our paper would be the first to test for convergence in TFP growth 
and its components using Phillips and Sul (2007) methodology. The task is to find the speed of 
convergence b-hat, and then apply a one-sided t-test. If t-statistics < -1.65, the null hypothesis 
of convergence is rejected at the 5% level. We report the speed of convergence and associated 
t-statistics in Tables 6 to 9. 
6.1. Results for bank types 
We start the analysis by testing for convergence in TFP growth and the effects of the five 
underlying TFP components over the whole sample. Results from the log t-test indicate that 
there is no convergence (see Table 6). Results from the club convergence test also show an 
absolute absence of convergence clubs. We further repeat the analysis for each bank type. We 
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find no club convergence for Regional Banks II. For the other two types, there exists 
convergence, reported in Table 6. For Regional Banks I, there is evidence of convergence for 
this sample in terms of productivity growth (b-hat = -0.189) and its components. However, the 
speed of convergence is slow as values of b-hat are negative in all data series. They are -0.137 
for the effect of bankrupt loans, -0.146 for the effect of restructured loans, -0.136 for the effect 
of equity, -0.132 for the scale effect, and -0.174 for the effect of technological change. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
For the sample of seven City Banks, the tests reveal some convergence clubs. Table 6 also 
reports the convergence coefficients for City Banks and associated t-statistics obtained from 
the log t-test for six data series. The null hypothesis of convergence in TFP growth in City 
Banks is rejected at the 5% level (b-hat = -1.534). Similarly, the null hypothesis of convergence 
for the effect of each component on TFP growth is rejected, which reinforces the divergence 
of TFP growth.  
The next step is to examine if there exists any cluster of convergence in TFP growth as 
well as in each of its underlying components. We find negative values of b-hat associated with 
almost all convergence clubs. These findings exhibit weak convergence with slow speed as the 
estimated b-hat is insignificantly different from zero. Matousek et al. (2015) also report a few 
negative b-hats in their Phillips and Sul (2007)’s convergence test for technical efficiency of 
the top 10 EU banks. Regarding TFP growth, we detect one convergence club which is formed 
of two banks (IDs 1 and 10). The same two banks are reported to constitute the club of 
convergence in the effect of bankrupt loans, restructured loans, equity, and the scale effect. In 
terms of the impact of technology, there are two clubs of convergence. Banks 1 and 16 are 
identified in the first club with a faster convergence speed (1.832) than banks 8 and 17 in the 
second club (-0.928). 
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6.2. Results by geographic regions 
Given that overall there is weak evidence regarding convergence, we further investigate 
whether there exists any convergence across geographic regions. We classify banks into eight 
regions based on their headquarters’ locations. These eight regions are the eight principal 
regions of Japan, namely Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, and 
Kyushu. Their relative geographic locations are illustrated in the map of Japan in Figure 1. The 
results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The log t-test and club convergence test denote that banks in Hokkaido, Tohoku, and 
Chubu converge in TFP growth. Among these regions, Chubu has the fastest convergence rate, 
while Tohoku is the slowest. Convergence in the five underlying components of TFP growth 
is also present in these three regions. There is no existence of convergence for banks in Kansai 
and Kyushu (see Table 7). We find some clubs of convergence for banks in Kanto, Chugoku, 
and Shikoku (see Table 8).  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
In our sample, the number of banks in Kanto is the largest compared to the numbers of 
banks in other regions. There are 24 banks, among which are six City Banks having their 
headquarters registered in Tokyo, which belongs to Kanto region. Note that City Banks and 
Regional Banks differ from each other in size, business structure, and focus. Hence, we would 
expect to find club convergence rather than convergence at the whole sample. In fact, results 
indicate a few clubs of convergence in TFP growth and its components. It is noteworthy that 
the club of banks 5, 16, 129, 522, and the club of banks 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 appear in most 
of the results for the data tested. 
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In Chugoku, there is one convergence club, formed of four banks 166, 167, 168, and 169, 
for productivity growth. The club convergence test for the underlying components of TFP 
growth also identifies this club. There is an additional convergence club (bank IDs: 170 and 
565) with slow convergence rate for the effect of restructured loans (b-hat = -5.27) and equity 
(b-hat = -5.42). Eight banks in the remaining region, Shikoku, converge in TFP growth (b-hat 
= 0.196). There also exists convergence in the effect of bankrupt loans (b-hat = -0.959), equity 
(b-hat = 2.714) and the scale effect (b-hat = 5.516). For the effect of restructured loans and 
technological change, there are convergence clubs instead. One club of convergence, 
constituted by banks 173, 174, 175, and 578, is reported for the effect of restructured loans (b-
hat = 2.297). For the impact of technological change, only bank 572 is not classified in the club 
of convergence.  
Overall, in eight principal geographic regions of Japan, there are four regions where there 
exists convergence in terms of productivity growth. We proceed by investigating further 
whether that convergence behaviour is present between regions. The data are averaged for each 
region and are applied for between-region convergence.13 Interestingly, all regions converge in 
terms of the impacts of bankrupt loans (b-hat = 0.112) and equity (b-hat = 2.931) on TFP 
growth (see Table 9). There exist clubs of convergence in other components of TFP growth. 
Regarding restructured loans, Tohoku, Chugoku, and Shikoku belong to one convergence club. 
With regard to the scale effect, there are two clubs. Club one (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, 
Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu) experiences a faster convergent process (at the rate of 0.613) 
compared to club two (Kanto and Kansai, at the rate of 1.54). Regarding technological change, 
the tests reveal three clubs of convergence. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
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Alas, convergence in TFP growth is not present between regions. The club convergence 
test uncovers two convergence clubs, which are illustrated in Figure 1 by the green and blue 
areas. The first club consists of two regions: Tohoku and Shikoku. The second club includes 
Chubu and Chugoku. There are 55 banks (all Regional Banks) in these regions, constituting 
45.5% of the number of banks in our sample. The null hypothesis of convergence in 
productivity growth is rejected for the remaining regions, which are displayed in red areas in 
Figure 1. This finding lends some support for limited convergence. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Interestingly, although being classified in the same convergence club, Tohoku and 
Shikoku are geographically distant from each other. However, there are similarities in terms of 
economic features between the two. First, they are the “poorer” regions compared to others in 
terms of gross regional product and income. Tohoku was traditionally the poorest, least 
developed part in Japan. The 2012 statistics for Tohoku and Shikoku were 181,241 and 134,789 
(hundred million JPY) in gross regional product respectively, and 135,051 and 101,341 
(hundred million JPY) in income respectively. Second, the main economic activities in both 
regions include agriculture, fishery, forestry, pulp and paper. For the other convergence club, 
Chugoku is similar to Chubu in terms of economic activities. Chubu, where Toyota - Japan’s 
largest company is based, is specialised in transportation equipment and textiles. Shipbuilding, 
automobile (Mazda’s head office is based in Hiroshima), and textile are also the dominant 
industries in Chugoku. 
The divergence club also consists of regions that are scattered across the country. 
Hokkaido and Kyushu are the two far-ends of Japan surface area, and they are not geographic 
neighbours with Kansai either. It could be due to the significant disparities in economic features 
that these regions are in the divergence group of productivity growth. Kanto is well known as 
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Japan’s economic heart, with Tokyo being one of the most important economic centres. Based 
on regional economic data in 2012, Kanto’s gross regional product and income (1,886,166 and 
1,439,151 hundred million JPY) were the highest among eight regions. 14  As previously 
mentioned, the majority of City Banks have their headquarters registered in Kanto. Kansai is a 
region, beside Kanto, contributing significantly to Japan’s economic wealth. Historically, 
Kansai developed as a major rice producing and trading area, with Osaka being the centre for 
economic activities. The Osaka-Kobe metropolitan area has been the modern manufacturing 
base for textile, machinery, metal, chemicals, and heavy industries since the 20th century. In 
contrast, the capital of Kyushu, Fukuoka, is specialised in services and the automobile industry, 
being one of the world’s largest car manufacturing bases. Hokkaido, on the other hand, is a 
popular island for tourists, and an important food-supply region. Sapporo, its capital, apart from 
tourism, is also well-known for the bio and IT industries. One thing in common but probably 
very important reflecting on the divergence of the three regions is that they all have a regional 
stock exchange market. They are Sapporo in Hokkaido, Osaka in Kansai, and Fukuoka in 
Kyushu. These markets are characterised by distinctive regional political economies which 
result in significant market segmentation (Hearn, 2016). The regional-related factors that 
distinguish banks in these diverging regions would be an interesting issue for future research. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This study quantifies the impact of uncontrollable inputs on productivity growth of 
Japanese commercial banks. We adopt a parametric methodology which allows for a 
decomposition of TFP growth with respect to the impact of uncontrollable inputs, namely 
bankrupt and restructured loans. Our finding reports an average productivity growth of 0.52% 
semi-annually. Productivity growth deteriorated during the restructuring period (2001-2003) 
and the following global financial crisis. Alongside the downturn of the scale effect, the loss in 
productivity growth was attributed to the adverse effect of bankrupt loans and the negative 
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impact of equity in a few periods. There exists evidence showing that some legislation changes 
have benefited the banking industry, indicated by the cost-reducing impact of restructured 
loans. 
We further proceed with convergence tests for TFP growth and its components. We 
employ the Phillips and Sul (2007)’s approach which is able to detect convergence clusters 
among sub-groups despite the presence of divergence at the whole panel level. The presented 
results have important policy implications. Over 15 years, there has been heterogeneity among 
banks, as they are recognised as diverging altogether. Nevertheless, within City Banks, there 
is some evidence of slow convergence. Regional Banks that operate in the same geographic 
regions appear to develop with some degree of commonality. The evidence of a banking 
integration process within and across some regions would assist policymakers to design 
appropriate schemes to promote growth. As the banking system remains the important channel 
to convey the economic impact of Abenomics – the current economic policy to combat deflation 
and boost growth, bank productivity growth would act as a signal for the effectiveness of this 
policy. It would be worth looking into the characteristics of the diverging regions so that 
modified versions of these policies would be more applicable. 
Given the negative interest rate policy enacted in January 2016 for the first time in Japan’s 
history, bank productivity gain could be an important indication for the efficacy of this central 
banking policy. However, negative interest rates should be accompanied by prudent lending 
standards and proper supervision in order not to increase the risk of bankrupt and restructured 
loans. Additionally, potential challenges associated with prolonged negative interest rates may 
limit bank productivity growth by, for example, lowering outputs. For instance, the fear of 
substantial deposit withdrawals may inhibit banks to pass the cost of negative rates on to retail 
depositors. Hence, if banks have to incur this cost, they may be reluctant to increase lending 
due to low profit margin (Bech & Malkhozov, 2016). These policy limitations are beyond the 
 
 
33 
scope of this paper. It would be an interesting area for future research to observe and study the 
benefits and drawbacks of negative interest rate on Japanese bank productivity growth. 
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8. APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Estimated parameters for the translog cost function 
Notations Variables Coefficient S.e Notations Variables Coefficient S.e 
 w2 0.8521*** 0.004  y1*RSL 0.0381** 0.016 
 y1 0.5275*** 0.022  y2*BRL 0.0958*** 0.015 
 y2 0.1088*** 0.013  y2*RSL -0.0422*** 0.008 
 BRL 0.0384*** 0.007  E*E 0.0415 0.026 
 RSL 0.0203*** 0.004  y1*E -0.1036** 0.043 
 E 0.0533*** 0.015  y2*E 0.0895*** 0.027 
 t -0.0042*** 0.000  w2*E 0.0404*** 0.011 
 w2*w2 0.0743*** 0.006  BRL*E -0.1127*** 0.019 
 y1*y1 0.5465*** 0.086  RSL*E 0.0213* 0.012 
 y2*y2 0.0745*** 0.016  E*t -0.0045*** 0.002 
 y1*y2 -0.2523*** 0.033  t*t -0.0002* 0.000 
 BRL*BRL 0.0280* 0.015  w2*t -0.0002 0.001 
 RSL*RSL -0.0082* 0.005  y1*t 0.0139*** 0.002 
 BRL*RSL -0.0196*** 0.007  y2*t -0.0038*** 0.001 
 w2*y1 -0.0563*** 0.017  BRL*t -0.0023** 0.001 
 w2*y2 -0.0018 0.009  RSL*t -0.0041*** 0.001 
 w2*BRL -0.0152** 0.007  Constant -0.0903*** 0.009 
 w2*RSL 0.0248*** 0.005 R
2 0.91   
 y1*BRL -0.0172 0.031 Observations 3484   
Notes: This Appendix reports the parameters estimated and corresponding standard errors from the translog cost 
function with input price w (price of fund w1; price of physical capital and labour w2; w1 is the normalising input 
price), output Y (net loans and bills discounted y1; earning assets y2), uncontrollable inputs (bankrupt loans BRL; 
restructured loans RSL), equity E, and time t. w1=(interest expense)/(deposits + borrowed funds); w2=noninterest 
expenses/fixed assets;  y1= net loans and bills discounted; y2 are call loans, receivables under resale agreement, 
receivables under securities borrowing transactions, bills bought, monetary claims bought, foreign exchanges, 
customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, investment securities, and other assets; Bankrupt loans = 
loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy + past due loans in arrears by 6 months or more. Restructured loans = past 
due loans in arrears by 3 months but less than 6 months + restructured loans. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 
1%, 5%, 10% level respectively; S.e: standard error. 
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Figure 1. Convergence in total factor productivity growth – Japan map. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This map illustrates the convergence in total factor productivity growth between regions. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
TC Total costs 57,055 172,876 153 2,267,130 
Y1 Net loans and bills discounted 3,342,342 8,387,483  124,016  76,700,336  
Y2 Earning assets 2,205,550  7,692,617  783  78,602,674  
w1 Price of fund 0.001233  0.001395  0.00013  0.026086  
w2 Price of physical capital and labour 0.757155  0.424054  0.003431  7.55578  
BRL Bankrupt loans 89,107  197,591  2,698  3,522,077  
RSL Restructured loans 43,424  154,252  48  2,701,164 
E Equity 242,010  678,690  2,845  7,425,766 
Notes: This Table reports summary statistics of main variables used in the translog cost function. Apart from w1 
and w2, all other variables are in Million JPY. Total cost = interest expenses + noninterest expenses. Net loans 
and bills discounted = loans and bills discounted – bankrupt loans – restructured loans. Earning assets are call 
loans, receivables under resale agreement, receivables under securities borrowing transactions, bills bought, 
monetary claims bought, foreign exchanges, customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, investment 
securities, and other assets. Price of financial capital = interest expenses/(deposits + borrowed funds). Price of 
overhead = noninterest expense/fixed assets. Bankrupt loans = loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy + past due 
loans in arrears by 6 months or more. Restructured loans = past due loans in arrears by 3 months but less than 6 
months + restructured loans. Std.Dev: Standard Deviation. 
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Table 2. Cost elasticities 
Time 
All banks City  Regional I Regional II 
BRL RSL Equity Outputs BRL RSL Equity Outputs BRL RSL Equity Outputs BRL RSL Equity Outputs 
Sep 2000-Mar 2003 0.0527 0.0510 0.0721 0.5630 0.0286 -0.0166 -0.0959 1.0539 0.0476 0.0456 0.0810 0.5780 0.0619 0.0659 0.0834 0.4822 
Sep 2003-Mar 2006 0.0313 0.0462 0.0998 0.5530 0.0265 -0.0156 0.0265 0.9325 0.0252 0.0395 0.1067 0.5689 0.0399 0.0636 0.1012 0.4793 
Sep 2006-Mar 2009 0.0470 0.0086 0.0415 0.6599 0.0226 -0.0410 -0.0047 1.0279 0.0405 0.0044 0.0453 0.6765 0.0592 0.0212 0.0423 0.5879 
Sep 2009-Mar 2012 0.0447 -0.0002 0.0194 0.6962 0.0011 -0.0551 -0.0045 1.0186 0.0386 -0.0022 0.0302 0.7055 0.0601 0.0106 0.0067 0.6366 
Sep 2012-Mar 2015 0.0148 -0.0106 0.0303 0.7216 -0.0468 -0.0601 -0.0268 1.1085 0.0103 -0.0133 0.0411 0.7303 0.0296 0.0000 0.0210 0.6577 
Sep 2000-Mar 2015 0.0385 0.0201 0.0537 0.6358 0.0088 -0.0359 -0.0221 1.0248 0.0325 0.0148 0.0608 0.6518 0.0507 0.0349 0.0541 0.5615 
Notes: This Table reports the elasticity of cost with respect to bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, and outputs for all banks and per type of banks. The 
figures are averaged per 6 semi-annual periods. Figures may not sum due to averaging and rounding. Mar: March, Sep: September. 
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Table 3. Average total factor productivity growth 
Time All banks City Regional I Regional II 
Mar 2001-Mar 2003 -0.870 2.324 -0.431 -1.780 
Sep 2003-Mar 2006 1.371 2.652 1.402 1.151 
Sep 2006-Mar 2009 0.273 -0.863 0.168 0.571 
Sep 2009-Mar 2012 1.092 2.927 1.165 0.739 
Sep 2012-Mar 2015 0.600 -2.174 0.796 0.612 
Mar 2001-Mar 2015 0.521 1.122 0.653 0.262 
Notes: This Table reports average total factor productivity growth every three fiscal 
years for all banks and for each type of banks. The figures are averaged per 6 semi-
annual periods, except the first time frame which includes 5 semi-annual periods. All 
values are in % and may not sum due to averaging and rounding. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Total factor productivity growth decomposition 
 
Time BRL RSL Equity Scale Technology 
Mar 2001-Mar 2003 -0.451 -0.495 0.106 -0.654 0.645 
Sep 2003-Mar 2006 0.041 0.392 -0.225 0.539 0.653 
Sep 2006-Mar 2009 -0.056 0.212 0.137 -0.374 0.355 
Sep 2009-Mar 2012 0.049 0.234 0.070 0.608 0.132 
Sep 2012-Mar 2015 0.018 0.118 -0.057 0.267 0.268 
Mar 2001-Mar 2015 -0.074 0.104 0.003 0.090 0.411 
Notes: This Table reports the effects of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, 
scale, and technological change on TFP growth for all banks. The figures are averaged per 6 semi-
annual periods, except the first time frame which includes 5 semi-annual periods. All values are in 
% and may not sum due to averaging and rounding. The sum of each row equals total factor 
productivity growth reported in Table 3 for all banks. 
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Table 5. Total factor productivity growth decomposition per bank type. 
 City  Regional I  Regional II 
Time BRL RSL Equity Scale Time  BRL RSL Equity Scale Time  BRL RSL Equity Scale Time 
03/2001-03/2003 0.104 1.697 -0.554 0.064 1.013  -0.385 -0.505 0.146 -0.402 0.713  -0.596 -0.749 0.139 -1.041 0.521 
09/2003-03/2006 -0.198 -0.065 0.932 1.257 0.727  0.046 0.332 -0.347 0.673 0.753  0.068 0.532 -0.229 0.266 0.513 
09/2006-03/2009 -0.675 -0.239 0.131 -0.432 0.353  -0.014 0.190 0.256 -0.697 0.431  -0.034 0.301 -0.029 0.085 0.247 
09/2009-03/2012 -0.103 0.170 0.143 2.039 0.696  0.052 0.143 0.153 0.616 0.200  0.066 0.380 -0.063 0.405 -0.049 
09/2012-03/2015 -0.231 0.243 0.216 -2.828 0.667  0.023 0.078 -0.094 0.444 0.345  0.042 0.164 -0.035 0.344 0.096 
03/2001-03/2015 -0.225 0.329 0.206 0.164 0.687  -0.045 0.066 0.019 0.143 0.481  -0.093 0.128 -0.046 0.006 0.277 
Notes: This Table reports the effects of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, scale, and technological change on TFP growth for all banks. The figures are 
averaged per 6 semi-annual periods, except the first time frame which includes 5 semi-annual periods. All values are in % and may not sum due to averaging and rounding. 
The sum of five components for each bank type in each row equals total factor productivity growth reported in Table 3 per bank type. 
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Table 6. Log t-test and club convergence test – All banks and per bank type. 
Bank types Data series Clubs Bank IDs b-hat t-statistics 
All banks 
TFP growth All banks: Divergent  -1.779 -12.824* 
BRL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.669 -12.009* 
RSL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.686 -12.183* 
Equity effect All banks: Divergent  -1.636 -12.207* 
Scale effect All banks: Divergent  -1.632 -12.333* 
Technological change All banks: Divergent  -1.684 -13.017* 
City 
TFP growth All banks: Divergent  -1.534 -4.653* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.005 -0.719 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.985 -3.905* 
BRL effect All banks: Divergent  -3.424 -3.354* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -1.915 -0.883 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.924 -3.873* 
RSL effect All banks: Divergent  -3.437 -3.362* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.027 -1.016 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.928 -3.871* 
Equity effect All banks: Divergent  -3.442 -3.371* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.029 -1.053 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.941 -3.895* 
Scale effect All banks: Divergent  -1.515 -4.654* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -1.940 -0.865 
 Club 2: Divergent  -4.009 -3.896* 
Technological change All banks: Divergent  -3.183 -3.361* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 16 1.832 2.307 
  Club 2: Convergent 8, 17 -0.928 -0.51 
  Club 3: Divergent  -5.967 -9.229* 
Regional I 
TFP growth All banks: Convergent  -0.189 -1.489 
BRL effect All banks: Convergent  -0.137 -1.021 
RSL effect All banks: Convergent  -0.146 -1.085 
Equity effect All banks: Convergent  -0.136 -1.001 
Scale effect All banks: Convergent  -0.132 -1.038 
Technological change All banks: Convergent  -0.174 -1.334 
Regional II 
TFP growth All banks: Divergent  -1.809 -12.408* 
BRL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.628 -12.52* 
RSL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.659 -12.486* 
Equity effect All banks: Divergent  -1.584 -12.819* 
Scale effect All banks: Divergent  -1.702 -12. 259* 
Technological change All banks: Divergent  -1.606 -13.2* 
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for TFP growth and the effect of each component 
on TFP growth in all banks and each bank type. The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club convergence test 
were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code by Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence coefficient or speed of 
convergence. If t-statistics<-1.65, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% significance level. The 
corresponding bank IDs are reported for each convergent club. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of 
convergence at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 7. Log t-test and club convergence test in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kansai, and 
Kyushu. 
Region Data b-hat t-stat Region Data b-hat t-stat 
Hokkaido TFP  0.776 1.293 Kansai TFP  -1.133 -4.636* 
 BRL  0.888 1.476  BRL  -1.069 -4.441* 
 RSL  0.867 1.446  RSL  -1.104 -4.525* 
 Equity  0.897 1.494  Equity  -1.052 -4.406* 
 Scale  0.845 1.404  Scale  -1.078 -4.467* 
 Tech. 0.896 1.492  Tech. -1.064 -4.472* 
Tohoku TFP  -0.107 -0.301 Kyushu TFP  -1.570 -5.735* 
 BRL  -0.083 -0.235  BRL  -1.557 -5.643* 
 RSL  -0.113 -0.319  RSL  -1.562 -5.68* 
 Equity  -0.11 -0.312  Equity  -1.55 -5.632* 
 Scale  -0.071 -0.202  Scale  -1.553 -5.673* 
 Tech. -0.132 -0.376  Tech. -1.568 -5.737* 
Chubu TFP  1.978 2.098     
 BRL  2.121 1.281     
 RSL  2.184 1.341     
 Equity  1.858 1.285     
 Scale  1.722 1.283     
 Tech. 2.032 1.586     
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for TFP growth and the effect of each component 
on TFP growth per region. The numbers of banks are: 3 in Hokkaido, 16 in Tohoku, 21 in Chubu, 18 in Kansai, 
and 21 in Kyushu. The data are total factor productivity growth (TFP), the effect of bankrupt loans (BRL), 
restructured loans (RSL), equity, the scale effect and technological change (Tech.) on TFP growth. The Phillips 
and Sul (2007) log t-test and club convergence test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code by Sul (2007). b-hat 
is the convergence coefficient or speed of convergence. If t-statistics (t-stat)<-1.65, the null hypothesis of 
convergence is rejected at the 5% significance level. If the null is rejected, we conduct club convergence test. * 
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 8. Log t-test and club convergence test in Kanto, Chugoku, and Shikoku. 
Data Clubs/Bank IDs b-hat t-stat  Data Clubs/Bank IDs b-hat t-stat 
For Kanto  For Chugoku 
TFP   -2.506 -15.207*  TFP  -3.754 -4.495* 
 17, 130, 133, 135, 517, 522 0.000 0.001   166, 167, 168, 169 0.274 0.282 
 8, 138 -1.477 -1.170   Divergent: the rest -8.757 -5.006* 
 5, 9, 128, 516, 526 -0.096 -0.704  BRL  -3.739 -4.446* 
 131, 134, 137, 150 -1.574 -1.525   166, 167, 168, 169 0.287 0.237 
 Divergent: the rest -5.464 -6.846*   Divergent: the rest -8.983 -4.928* 
BRL   -2.115 -14.078*  RSL  -3.747 -4.468* 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.049 1.321   166, 167, 168, 169 0.298 0.281 
 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 0.23 3.66   170, 565 -5.27 -1.188 
 17, 130, 150, 517 2.378 1.944   Divergent: the rest -12.177 -6.211* 
 Divergent: the rest -4.31 -5.533*  Equity  -3.732 -4.437* 
RSL   -2.093 -13.956*   166, 167, 168, 169 0.307 0.258 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.068 1.696   170, 565 -5.42 -1.63 
 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 0.206 3.28   Divergent: the rest -12.41 -5.893* 
 130, 150 1.031 1.009  Scale  -3.732 -4.461* 
 517, 525 0.631 0.586   166, 167, 168, 169 0.295 0.293 
 131, 134 0.758 0.309   Divergent: the rest -8.739 -4.976* 
 Divergent: the rest -3.881 -3.323*  Tech.  -3.745 -4.457* 
Equity   -2.116 -13.81*   166, 167, 168, 169 0.29 0.246 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.066 1.912   Divergent: the rest -8.938 -4.935* 
 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 0.207 3.369      
 9, 150, 517 0.574 0.445      
 17, 130, 525 0.173 0.249   
 128, 134 -3.392 -1.505  For Shikoku 
 Divergent: the rest -5.187 -4.985*  TFP   0.196 0.774 
Scale   -2.515 -15.069*  BRL   -0.959 -0.692 
 17, 130, 517 0.249 1.195  RSL   -1.383 -2.558* 
 134, 137, 150 0.446 0.212   173, 174, 175, 578 2.297 2.126 
 Divergent: the rest -0.264 -6.039*   Divergent: the rest -4.239 -9.634* 
Tech.  -2.337 -14.754*  Equity   2.714 0.96 
 8, 17, 130 -0.923 -1.171  Scale   5.516 4.979 
 
16, 128, 131, 134, 137, 150, 
516, 517, 525, 530 
-0.157 -1.292  Tech.  -0.966 -7.838* 
 133, 135 -3.849 -1.461   
172, 173, 174, 
175, 573, 576, 578 
-0.175 -0.835 
 Divergent: the rest -3.627 -5.301*   Divergent: 572   
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for TFP growth and the effect of each component 
on TFP growth per region. The numbers of banks are: 24 in Kanto, 10 in Chugoku, and 8 in Shikoku. The data 
are total factor productivity growth (TFP), the effect of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, 
the scale effect and technological change (Tech.) on TFP growth. The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club 
convergence test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code by Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence coefficient or 
speed of convergence. If t-statistics (t-stat)<-1.65, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. If the null is rejected, we conduct club convergence test. The corresponding bank IDs are 
reported for each convergent club. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% 
significance level. 
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Table 9. Log t-test and club convergence test across regions. 
Data series Clubs b-hat t-statistics 
TFP growth All regions: Divergent -5.591 -14.809* 
 Club 1: Tohoku, Shikoku 2.234 0.965 
 Club 2: Chubu, Chugoku 0.582 0.295 
 Club 3: Divergent -9.760 -10.915* 
BRL effect All regions: Convergent 0.112 0.109 
RSL effect All regions: Divergent -4.554 -9.693* 
 Club 1: Tohoku, Chugoku, Shikoku 0.136 0.136 
 Club 2: Divergent -6.592 -13.244* 
Equity effect All regions: Convergent 2.931 1.5 
Scale effect All regions: Divergent -2.220 -10.106* 
 
Club 1: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, 
Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu 
0.613 2.863 
 Club 2: Kanto, Kansai 1.540 1.192 
Technological change All regions: Divergent -4.147 -57.098* 
 Club 1: Hokkaido, Kanto -0.235 -0.402 
 Club 2: Chubu, Chugoku 0.651 4.307 
 Club 3: Tohoku, Kyushu 0.107 0.146 
 Club 4: Divergent -4.482 -46.464* 
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for regional average TFP growth and the effect 
of each component on TFP growth of banks across regions. The data are total factor productivity growth (TFP), 
the effect of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, the scale effect and technological change on 
TFP growth. The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club convergence test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss 
code by Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence coefficient or speed of convergence. If t-statistics<-1.65, the null 
hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% significance level. If the null is rejected, we conduct club 
convergence test. The corresponding regions are reported for each convergent club. * indicates rejection of the 
null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level.  
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ENDNOTES 
1 The decomposition is similar to decomposing productivity growth with respect to public infrastructure in 
agriculture (Mamatzakis, 2003; Morrison & Schwartz, 1996) or branch growth in banking (Kim & Weiss, 1989). 
2 Using information on nonperforming loans, Drake and Hall (2003) argue that reducing these loans, to some 
extent, is not under bank managers’ control, but the financial ability of borrowers and their willingness of 
repayment. Nonperforming loans have been mentioned in Hughes and Mester (2010) as a proxy for quasi-fixed 
input, but they do not provide empirical results. 
3 Subscripts i and t for bank i at time t are omitted for simplification. Our data consist of K = 2 input prices, M = 
2 outputs, J = 2 uncontrollable inputs (bankrupt and restructured loans). 
4 From equation (6), we can obtain equation (7) by totally differentiating equation (2) with respect to time and 
with some arrangements detailed as below: 
 ▪ The total differentiation of equation (2) with respect to time is:  
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▪ Dividing both sides of equation (f.4.1) by total cost, we get:  
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▪ For the right-hand side of equation (f.4.2), multiplying and dividing the first term and second term with kw and 
kX respectively, we get: 
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▪ As CXwS kkk = , rearranging (f.4.3), we obtain: 
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5 Subscripts i for banks (i=1,..., N) and t for time (t=1,…, N) are omitted for simplification. 
6 Please refer to Data section. 
7 Parameters are presented in Appendix A. 
8 City Banks were strongly engaged in a so-called main bank system (Hoshino, 2002), in which they had strong 
ties with their clients. After the second half of the 20th century, this business network has gradually shrunk (Lincoln 
& Shimotani, 2010). In this type of relationship, there exist interlocking shareholdings among banks and their 
client firms. Apart from funding, banks provide member firms with management assistance. If restructured loans 
were disposed, banks would terminate their financial relation with the firms in question, and force them to declare 
bankruptcy. Hence, City Banks might have incentives to carry on funding troubled firms to assist them in regaining 
their financial health. In addition, as City Banks are the largest commercial bank group, they may have available 
resources to withstand restructured loans and recover these loans within the time frame set out in the regulatory 
framework. Furthermore, since October 2012, the Bank of Japan has pursued aggressive quantitative easing (Bank 
of Japan’s announcement on 30/10/2012), which benefits financial institutions in terms of funding, but may 
discourage proper credit screening. These countervailing effects might be reflected in the negative cost elasticities 
with respect to bankrupt loans from September 2012 to March 2015. Note that the Japanese economy has been 
struggling to strive from deflation since 2009, notably indicated by the implementation of negative interest rate in 
January 2016. If the economic slump is not attributed to banks not willing to lend (due to the fear of bad loans), 
but the lack of borrowers, there could be less incentive for banks to accelerate the disposal of bankrupt loans. 
9 Japanese annual GDP growth rate in 2004 was 2.4%, highest since 2000 (source: OECD statistics). 
10 Phillips and Sul (2007) show that the formulation for δit ensures it converges to δi for all α≥0. Refer to their 
paper for the derivation of the log t regression equation. 
11 Please refer to Phillips and Sul (2007), pp. 1798-1801 for more details. 
12 After computing TFP growth, we exclude some banks from the convergence test because they have too few 
observations. 
13 The graphs of the transition paths for TFP growth and the impact of each component are available upon request. 
14 Source: Social Indicators by Prefectures, available from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of International Affairs and 
Communications, Japan. 
                                                           
